Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 71

Issue 1

Article 4

2020

Book Review: Putting the Constitution in its Place
Edward L. Rubin

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Edward L. Rubin, Book Review: Putting the Constitution in its Place, 71 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 15 (2020)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol71/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an
authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020

— Book Review —

Putting the Constitution
in its Place
Shlomo Slonim, Forging the American
Nation, 1787-1793: James Madison and
the Federalist Revolution (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan 2017).
Edward L. Rubin†
Contents
Introduction .................................................................................... 16
I. Slonim’s Account .......................................................................... 17
II. Slonim’s Lessons ........................................................................... 23
III. The Electoral College ............................................................. 33

†

Edward Rubin is University Professor of Law and Political Science at
Vanderbilt University. He specializes in administrative law, constitutional
law and legal theory. He is the author of Making Regulation Work (Eliva,
forthcoming 2021), Soul, Self and Society: The New Morality and the
Modern State (Oxford, 2015); Beyond Camelot: Rethinking Politics and
Law for the Modern State (Princeton, 2005) and two books with Malcolm
Feeley, Federalism: Political Identity and Tragic Compromise (Michigan,
2011) and Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State: How the Courts
Reformed America's Prisons (Cambridge, 1998). In addition, he is the
author of two casebooks, The Regulatory State (with Lisa Bressman and
Kevin Stack) (Wolters Kluwer, 3d ed. 2020), and The Payments System
(with Robert Cooter) (West, 1990), three edited volumes (two on legal
scholarship and one on crime policy) and The Heatstroke Line (Sunbury,
2015) a science fiction novel about the fate of the United States if climate
change is not brought under control. Professor Rubin joined Vanderbilt
Law School as Dean and the first John Wade–Kent Syverud Professor of
Law in July 2005, serving a four-year term. Previously, he taught at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School from 1998 to 2005, and at the
Berkeley School of Law from 1982 to 1998, where he served as an associate
dean. Professor Rubin has served as a consultant to the People's Republic
of China on administrative law and to the Russian Federation on
payments law.

15

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020
Putting the Constitution in its Place

Introduction
The fact that Donald Trump became President in 2016, despite
losing the popular vote by a substantial margin, has brought renewed
attention to the Electoral College system.1 In Forging the American
Nation,2 Shlomo Slonim provides an illuminating account of the process
that led to this bizarre method of determining the outcome of presi–
dential elections. But Professor Slonim’s book also provides insights
into the origins of many other structural features of our constitutional
system that are of questionable value in a modern democracy, such as
elections by state for the Senate, the Senate’s exclusive exercise of
legislative authority for treaties and appointments, and the constraints
on the authority of our central government.
The book covers the drafting and ratification of the Constitution
between the years 1787 and 1791,3 and also moves backward into times
preceding the Articles of Confederation era and forward to the Marshall
Court’s decisions, culminating with McCulloch v. Maryland in 1819.4
Although the events it describes are among the most fully documented
in world history,5 Forging the American Nation provides a new and
1.

See Editorial Board, Editorial, Time to End the Electoral College, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 19, 2016, at A26; Kyron Huigens, The Electoral College Is
Actually Worse Than You Think—Here’s Why, Observer (Feb. 27, 2019,
4:37
PM),
https://observer.com/2019/02/electoral-college-explanationpopular-vote-loses/ [https://perma.cc/7RJ3-PL7B]; Denise Lu, The Electoral
College Misrepresents Every State, But Not as Much as You Think, Wash.
Post (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/
how-fair-is-the-electoral-college/ [https://perma.cc/PX2Y-LUJC]; William
Petrocelli, Voters in Wyoming Have 3.6 Times the Voting Power That I
Have. It’s Time to End the Electoral College, HuffPost (Nov. 11, 2017, 4:52
PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/its-time-to-end-the-electoral-college
_b_12891764 [https://perma.cc/FPT3-C48G].

2.

Shlomo Slonim, Forging the American Nation, 1787-1791: James
Madison and the Federalist Revolution (Palgrave Macmillan, ed.
2017).

3.

Id. at 1, 9–10.

4.

Slonim, supra note 2, at 85–90, 205–27; see also McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).

5.

For just some of the recent books on the subject, see Richard Beeman,
Plain, Honest Men: The Making of the American Constitution
(2009); Michael J. Faber, An Anti-Federalist Constitution: The
Development of Dissent in the Ratification Debates (2019); Michael
J. Klarman, The Framers’ Coup: The Making of the United States
Constitution (2016); Pauline Maier, Ratification: The People
Debate the Constitution, 1787–88 (2010); Jack N. Rakove, Original
Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution
(1996); David O. Stewart, The Summer of 1787: The Men Who
Invented the Constitution (2007).
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valuable perspective on them. Slonim joins other recent authors who
approach the Convention and ratification process with a degree of
skepticism, but, in this relatively succinct book, he identifies certain
themes with unusual clarity and legal precision. In doing so, he also
offers clear lessons for constitutional interpretation and particular
support for the Legal Process School’s argument that the structural
features of the Constitution should not be interpreted strictly, if at all,
by the courts.6 This review summarizes some of the main themes that
Professor Slonim describes (Part I) and then discusses the implications
about contemporary constitutional interpretation that flow from that
account (Part II). It ends with some specific implications about the
Electoral College and a pending effort to reform it, the National Popular
Vote Initiative.

I. Slonim’s Account
The story of the book is so familiar as to render even a brief
summary unnecessary. Instead, this section will describe some of the
principal themes that emerge from Professor Slonim’s rendition of the
story. These are the character and fate of James Madison’s nationalist
ideas, the role of the small states, and the role of slavery.
Madison is described in popular literature about American history
as the Father of the Constitution.7 Professor Slonim’s account reveals
that this sobriquet (and incidentally, his own subtitle) is misleading.8
To be sure, we tend to view the Constitutional Convention through
Madison’s eyes, since his notes are the centerpiece of the leading
document collection on the subject.9 He is also the author of the most
6.

For two comprehensive examples of this approach, see Jesse H. Choper,
Judicial Review and the National Political Process: A Functional
Reconsideration of the Role of the Supreme Court (1980) and John
Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review
(1980). The theory these authors describe developed during the previous three
decades.

7.

See, e.g., James Madison, Father of the U.S. Constitution,
ConstitutionFacts.com, https://www.constitutionfacts.com/us-constitu
tion-amendments/james-madison/ [https://perma.cc/8KPR-KRD9] (last
visited Oct. 12, 2020); Irving Brant, James Madison: The Father of the
Constitution, Encyc. Britannica (June 24, 2020), https://www.britan
nica.com/biography/James-Madison/The-father-of-the-Constitution [https:
//perma.cc/FX8J-TCC4]; Colleen Sheehan, James Madison: Father of the
Constitution, Heritage Found. (Apr. 8, 2013), https://www.heritage.org/
political-process/report/james-madison-father-the-constitution [https://perm
a.cc/Z43R-MCBW].

8.

Slonim, supra note 2, at 31.

9.

1 United States Constitutional Convention, The Records of
the Federal Convention of 1787, at xv–xvii (Max Farrand ed., 1966)
(“And from the day of their publication until the present, Madison’s notes
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noteworthy justifications for the constitutional structure10 and the
primary draftsman of the Bill of Rights.11 But ascribing parentage to
Madison obscures the extent to which the Constitution was not in fact
the product of this great political theorist and visionary, but of a host
of ordinary politicians, concerned with their own careers, answerable to
their home-state interests and interest groups, and dominated or
distracted by the immediate pressures of the day.
As Professor Slonim recounts, Madison had a very different vision
of the Constitution from the one that actually emerged from the
Convention.12 He could be described, at least at that time, as a radical
nationalist or Federalist.13 His position was that “the states, as such,
would have to be precluded from any role in the governing structure of
the national authority, and secondly, the authority would be empow–
ered to exercise a supervisory veto over state legislation.”14 Both
elements of this formulation were defeated in the Convention. The first,
embodied in the Virginia Plan, was rejected in favor of the New Jersey
Plan, which granted all states an equal vote in the legislature’s upper
house, whose members were to be chosen by the state legislatures.15
That body, where states and not citizens were represented, was then
given the sole authority to approve treaties (by a two-thirds vote in
fact) and to confirm presidential appointments. Madison’s proposal for
a Congressional veto was modified and then rejected, with even his
Federalist allies opposing it because they thought it would make
ratification impossible.16 Several months after the Convention ended,
Madison continued to bemoan the rejection of the veto as undermining
the authority that he thought the central government needed to fulfill

of the Debates have remained the standard authority for the proceedings
of the Convention.”). The third volume of this definitive collection feat–
ures supplementary materials; mainly letters. Most of them are by people
other than Madison, but he dominates the final 70 documents, which
consist of later reminiscences about the Convention. See 3 id. at 434–551.
10.

See The Federalist Nos. 10, 14 (James Madison).

11.

Slonim, supra note 2, at 179–89.

12.

Id. at 31–32.

13.

Id. For his subsequent political gyrations, see Slonim, supra note 2, at 206–
18; see also Lynne Cheney, James Madison: A Life Reconsidered
(2014); Noah Feldman, The Three Lives of James Madison: Genius,
Partisan, President (2017).

14.

Slonim, supra note 2, at 32.

15.

Id. at 33–34, 39.

16.

Id. at 66–70.
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its mission.17 As a strong or radical Federalist, Madison also believed
that a bill of rights was an unnecessary constraint on the national
legislature.18 The reason he acceded to Jefferson’s demand and drafted
the document was not because he shared Jefferson’s belief in its
necessity but because he realized that it would be the best way to fore–
stall demands by New York and Virginia Anti-Federalists for a second
constitutional convention that might weaken the national government
still further.19 In short, the Constitution is at best a wayward child,
badly injured and debased by a rough world from which its parent could
not shield it.
Many of those injuries and debasements result from a second theme
in Professor Slonim’s book—the role of the small states at the Conven–
tion. While the disproportionate influence that the Constitution, and
specifically the Electoral College system, gives to smaller states is
widely recognized, and commentators discern a resulting conservative
bias, we do not think of small states as a separate interest group. The
most common contrast notes that votes for President in Wyoming, a
reliably red state, count for 3.6 times as much as votes in California, a
reliably blue one.20 But the calculation yields an almost equal
disproportion between Wyoming and Texas, also a red state, or between
Texas and the next least populous state, Vermont, which is reliably
blue.21 In other words, there is no politically salient difference between
large and small states per se.22 Thus, the contemporary political signi–
17.

Id. at 70–71; see also Charles F. Hobson, The Negative on State Laws:
James Madison, the Constitution, and the Crisis of the Republican
Government, 36 Wm. & Mary Q. 215, 216, 229–32 (1979).

18.

Lesley Kennedy, Before Drafting the Bill of Rights, James Madison
Argued the Constitution Was Fine Without It, History (Sept. 9, 2019),
https://www.history.com/news/bill-of-rights-constitution-first-10amendments-james-madison [https://perma.cc/CW65-9T42].

19.

Slonim, supra note 2, at 163–75.

20.

See, e.g., Editorial Board, supra note 1; Petrocelli, supra note 1.

21.

See United States Electoral College Votes by State, Encyc. Britannica
(Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.britannica.com/topic/United-States-ElectoralCollege-Votes-by-State-1787124 [https://perma.cc/FPT3-C48G]. Wyoming
and Vermont each have three electoral votes, while Texas has thirty-eight.
Id.

22.

One scientist and mathematician, who measured impact against number
of ballots cast, confirmed that small states are most advantaged by the
Electoral College, with the eight states whose votes counted for more than
twice the average being Wyoming, District of Columbia, Vermont, Alaska,
Hawaii, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and South Dakota, all with three or
four electoral votes. Dale R. Durran, Whose Votes Count Least in the
Electoral College?, Conversation (Mar. 13, 2017, 8:19 PM), http://
theconversation.com/whose-votes-count-the-least-in-the-electoral-college74280 [https://perma.cc/88SE-QKXJ]. All these states vote reliably in
one direction or another, but exactly half vote blue and in fact are among
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ficance of the Electoral College is not entirely clear. Professor Slonim
explains, however, that the small states functioned as a unified interest
group at the Constitutional Convention.23 Their concern was that the
larger states, specifically Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia,
would use a strong central government to dominate them, and perhaps
even destroy them.24 This led them to oppose Madison’s Virginia Plan
with the New Jersey Plan that gave all states equal representation in
the Senate and gave the Senate its authority over treaties and
appointments. And it was directly responsible for the Electoral
College.25
The concerns of the smaller states, as Professor Slonim explains
them, are understandable, but they are neither admirable nor farsighted. Each of the thirteen colonies had been administered separately
by Britain.26 Although independence was declared by the newly formed
Continental Congress, and the war against Britain was pursued under
Congress’ auspices, the machinery of day-to-day governance of each
state was in the hands of the local elites who had taken control of the
colonial apparatus.27 It was natural for them to see the nation as
separate polities that might engage in commercial or even military
conflict, and for those who controlled the smaller states to ally with
each other and assert disproportionate control over the central
government.28 However understandable, this was certainly not admir–
able; it committed the common error of assuming that the interests of
the governing elites were equivalent to the interests of the citizens, and
that their continued control of the state government would be more
beneficial for their citizens than any decision made by the majority of
the nation.29 Neither was the alliance of small states particularly farsighted. It should not have required much imagination to realize that
the most reliably Democratic states in the nation, none having voted
Republican in the last seven presidential elections. See, e.g., David
Weigel, The 50 Political States of America, Wash Post (Sept. 22, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/politics/united-statespolitical-geography/ [https://perma.cc/Z8G8-VYAY].
23.

Slonim, supra note 2, at 41.

24.

Id. at 35, 44.

25.

Id. at 41–46, 49–50.

26.

See Jon Butler, Becoming America: The Revolution before 1776,
at 89–130 (2000); Alan Taylor, American Colonies: The Settling
of North America 117–272 (2001).

27.

See Robert M. Weir, Who Shall Rule at Home: The American Revolution
as a Crisis of Legitimacy for the Colonial Elite, 6 J. Interdisc. Hist.
679, 679–84 (1976).

28.

Id.

29.

Id.
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the issues that would divide a functioning nation would not revolve
around the size of its political subdivisions. The separate identity of the
small states disappeared almost as soon as the nation was formed, to
be replaced by more substantive divisions.30 But it left a powerful
imprint on the constitutional design, one that we continue to live with
long after the birth pains of the new nation had been forgotten.
The most divisive of those substantive issues was slavery, and this
also left an indelible imprint on the Constitution. As Professor Slonim
notes, William Wiecek identifies ten clauses in the Constitution that
explicitly refer to slavery,31 while Paul Finkelman identifies no fewer
than fifteen.32 In fact, Slonim argues, every clause of the Constitution
was influenced by the Southern states’ desire to protect their “peculiar
institution.”33 It motivated the Southern delegates to increase the
representation of the slave states in the House of Representatives
through the three-fifths clause;34 to demand that the Senate be designed
to represent states, rather than citizens who were more numerous in
the North despite that clause;35 to insist that this Senate be given the
exclusive role in approving treaties and ambassadors;36 to endorse a
bizarre method of determining the election of the chief executive that
gave decisive weight to the three-fifths-based House and the states-quastates Senate;37 to enumerate the powers granted to Congress in place
of a general provision that might have permitted legislation regarding
slavery; and to construct an elaborate method of amendment that
demanded both a supermajority in the three-fifths-based House, the
state-qua-states Senate, and the states themselves.38 Based on the
picture that Professor Slonim paints for us, it is clear that slavery was
never absent from the minds of the Southern delegates. Those provis–
30.

Cf. Slonim, supra note 2, at 205, 214–15.

31.

Id. at 38 n.38 (citing William M. Wiecek, The Witch at the Christening:
Slavery and the Constitution’s Origins, in The Framing and Ratification
of the Constitution 167, 168 (Levy W. Mahoney & Dennis J. Mahoney
eds., 1987)).

32.

Id. (citing Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the Constitutional Convention:
Making a Covenant with Death, in Beyond Confederation: Origins
of the Constitution and American National Identity 188, 190–92
(Richard R. Beeman, Stephen Botein & Edward Carlos Carter, eds.,
1987)).

33.

Kenneth M. Stampp, The Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the
Ante-Bellum South (1st ed. 1956); see Slonim, supra note 2, at 38–41.

34.

Slonim, supra note 2, at 38.

35.

Id. at 39.

36.

Id. at 45–46.

37.

Id. at 38–39.

38.

Id. at 37, 39.
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ions that reflect a more democratic ethos, such as the requirement that
money bills begin in the House, or that reflect a concern for human
rights, such as the prohibition against bills of attainder, were adopted
because there was no way to use them to abolish or diminish slavery.39
The enumerated powers clause is a particularly notable example of
this issue’s overwhelming influence. Madison’s original proposal for the
powers of Congress, regarded throughout the Convention as the
defining feature of federal authority, was that it would legislate “in all
cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or in which the
harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of
individual [state] [l]egislation.”40 When the subject was discussed by the
Convention as a whole, the slave state delegates objected, clearly
concerned that it would empower a Northern controlled Congress to
express its disapproval of slavery.41 Pierce Butler of South Carolina (the
state that would subsequently start the Civil War42) declared: “The
security the South[ern] States want is that their negroes not be taken
from them which some gentlemen within or without doors, have a very
good mind to do.”43 But proposals to enumerate, and thereby limit, the
powers of Congress were rejected by the Convention as a whole.44
Because the Southern demand was insistent, and several of the leading
nationalists such as James Wilson and Gouverneur Morris wanted a
more precise formulation, the issue was referred to the Committee on
Detail, chaired by John Rutledge, also of South Carolina.45 Contrary to
the instructions of the Convention when referring the matter, Rutledge
induced the Committee to produce a clause enumerating specific powers
that were granted to Congress.46 Slonim concludes that “the prime
consideration for enumeration was the demand of the slave states to
ensure that the federal government not be empowered to interfere with
the system of slavery.”47 The delegates accepted Rutledge’s revision of
their original plan because they were aware that in this case, as in so

39.

Cf. id. at 36–41.

40.

Id. at 60 (alteration in original) (quoting 3 United States Constitutional
Convention, supra note 9, app. C at 593 (The Virginia Plan)).

41.

Id. at 61–62.

42.

See David J. Eicher, The Longest Night: A Military History of
the Civil War 33–52 (2001); Kenneth M. Stampp, And the War
Came: The North and the Session Crisis 85 (1950).

43.

Slonim, supra note 2, at 62 (quoting 1 United States Constitutional
Convention, supra note 9, at 605).

44.

Id. at 62–63, 65.

45.

Id. at 65–66.

46.

Id. at 64.

47.

Id. at 65–66.

22

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020
Putting the Constitution in its Place

many others, a weakened federal government was the price of Southern
agreement to the union.

II. Slonim’s Lessons
It is difficult, in general, to avoid drawing normative implications
from history. It is impossible for a history of the Constitution, not only
because the Constitution is so important to us, but also because public
officials who must follow the Constitution regularly and explicitly
invoke history to guide their actions. Thus, it is natural to ask what
lessons we can learn from Professor Slonim’s account or—to be more
specific—what can he tell us about the way we should interpret the
document. The lesson that seems to emerge with striking clarity is that
we should not treat the language of the Constitution with the sort of
reverence and excessive attention that popular discourse and originalist
scholars demand. In other words, based on the way Professor Slonim
puts the Constitution in context as an historical matter, we should put
it in its place as a normative matter.
Of course, no constitutional scholar or political leader argues that
we should ignore the language of the Constitution. It is enacted positive
law and deserves the attention and obedience that attaches to such
enactments in our legal system. The question is whether it merits
additional respect as the pronouncement of people with unusual
wisdom, or who were positioned at an unusually fortuitous time in our
political history. In other words, should the Constitution be treated as
ordinary law, to be interpreted in the light of current circumstances
and evolving norms, or should we treat it as a higher law to be
interpreted in accordance with its original meaning?48

48.

It is, of course, possible to argue that ordinary law, that is, statutes, should
also be interpreted based on their original meaning. This does not correspond
to any of the prevailing schools of statutory interpretation, however.
Textualists are certainly opposed to approaches that allow the meaning of a
statute to evolve over time, but they want to ground interpretation on the
enacted language, not original intent. See generally Antonin Scalia, A
Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (1997);
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpret–
ation of Legal Texts (2012); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains,
50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 533 n.2, 548 (1983). Justice Scalia’s insistence that
legislative history should never be considered is emblematic of this focus on
enacted language as opposed to intent. Those who argue that legislative
history should be consulted want to treat it as one consideration, not an
exclusive principle, and generally favor the idea of evolving meaning as well.
See, e.g., Robert Katzmann, Judging Statutes 35, 39 (2014); Cass R.
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L. Rev.
405, 428–29, 493 (1989).
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In the Western world, approaches to authoritative texts derive from
the interpretation of Scripture.49 Over the course of the two millennia
of Christianity, there have been a variety of approaches, but the
Modern Era is dominated by the rivalry between Catholic and
Protestant interpretation, one of the main theoretical issues that define
these contesting faiths.50 Catholics believe that there is a human agency
on Earth that can provide definitive interpretations of the text—the
Church, headed by the Pope.51 Thus, the understanding of the text can
change in response to changing circumstances, not because the text is
wrong, but because its significance for people’s lives is revealed over
time through authoritative interpretation.52 Protestants believe that
49.

See generally Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics and Criticism:
And Other Writings (Andrew Bowie ed. & trans., 1998) (developing a
method of interpreting the language used within biblical text); Hans-Georg
Gadamer, The Universality of the Hermeneutic Problem, in Philosophical
Hermeneutics 3, 17 (David E. Linge ed. & trans., 1976) (“Language occurs
once again, in vocabulary and grammar as always, and never without the inner
infinity of the dialogue that is in progress between every speaker and his
partner. That is the fundamental dimension of hermeneutics.”); Richard E.
Palmier, Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher,
Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer (1969) (comparing and contrasting
definitions of hermeneutics and the perspective of foundational theorists). The
tradition of modern literary analysis in the Western world is generally regarded
as beginning with Schleiermacher’s interpretation of the Bible. Nasrullah
Mambrol, Literary Criticism of Friedrich Schleiermacher, Literary and
Theory Criticism: Literariness (Dec. 23, 2017), https://literariness.org/
2017/12/23/literary-criticism-of-friedrich-schleiermacher/ [https://perma.cc/
H43C-B2 72] (“The German philosopher and Protestant theologian Friedrich
Schleiermacher . . . is generally credited with having laid the foundations of
modern hermeneutics, or the art of systematic textual interpretation.”).

50.

Protestants identify five Solae as distinguishing their version of Christianity
from that of the Catholic Church. John Barber, The Road from Eden:
Studies in Christianity and Culture 233 (2008) (“The message of the
Lutheran and Reformed theologians has been codified into a simple set of
five Latin phrases: Sola Scriptura (Scripture alone), Solus Christus (Christ
alone), Sola Fide (faith alone), Sola Gratia (by grace alone) and Soli Deo
Gloria (glory to God alone).”).

51.

See, e.g., Bible Can Only be Understood with the Church, Pope Tells Scholars,
Cath. News Agency (Apr. 23, 2009, 11:00 AM), https://www.catholic
newsagency.com/news/bible_can_only_be_understood_with_the_church
_pope_tells_scholars [https://perma.cc/PET9-S3Y5] (quoting Pope Benedict
XVI, Address at the Pontifical Biblical Commission’s Plenary Assembly (Apr.
23, 2009)) (“[A] correct understanding of Scripture . . . rises from the Tradition
of the Church.”).

52.

See generally Christopher McMahon, Reading the Gospels: Biblical
Interpretation in the Catholic Tradition (2012); Peter S. Williamson,
Catholic Principles for Interpreting Scripture, 65 Cath. Biblical Q. 327,
336 (2003) (recognizing the principle that “the Bible itself and the history of
its interpretation demonstrate a pattern of re-reading texts in the light of new
circumstances”).
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there is no such human agency, but rather that the true interpretation
resides in the text itself, and each generation of people must refer back
to that original text for authoritative guidance.53
The way in which these theories of Biblical interpretation have been
translated into constitutional law is obvious, but one aspect of the
analogy merits emphasis in exploring the significance of Professor
Slonim’s book. The Catholic approach, which clearly informs the theory
of an evolving Constitution, depends on accepting both the authority
of the judiciary and the force of precedent. The analogy is imperfect, of
course, because the Supreme Court does not claim to be directly
inspired by the Framers nor infallible in its interpretations. But the
force of the analogy lies in the common idea that the text, although
authoritative, is a product of its times, that is, the text spoke to people
in the language of its day and thus must be reframed for people of a
later era by agents that the text itself empowers. The Protestant
approach, which informs originalism, is that each era must approach
the text anew and has the authority to correct prior misinterpre–
tations.54 Again, the analogy is imperfect because no originalist asserts
that the Constitution was written by an omniscient being who could
speak directly and comprehensibly to people in a future time. But the
force of this analogy is that the Framers of the Constitution were
unusually wise and prescient human beings who could craft a document
that transcended the particular concerns of the time when it was
drafted.
Professor Slonim’s account of the Constitution’s framing refutes
this originalist image of its authors. The men who gathered in Phila–
delphia in the summer of 1787 were not a group of sages or Platonic
Guardians meeting in some empyrean realm to contemplate the long53.

See generally Joel R. Beeke, Sinclair B. Ferguson, W. Robert
Godfrey, Ray Lanning, John MacArthur, R.C. Sproul, Derek W.H.
Thomas & James White, Sola Scriptura!: The Protestant Position
on the Bible 3 (Don Kistler ed., 2009) (describing the Protestant position
“that all things necessary for salvation and concerning faith and life are
taught in the Bible clearly enough for the ordinary believer to find it there
and understand”); Keith A. Mathison, The Shape of Sola Scriptura
(2001) (defending the ancient doctrine regarding Christian scriptures as the
exclusive source of authority); John C. Peckham, Canonical Theology:
The Biblical Canon, Sola Scriptura, and Theological Method
(2016) (developing a detailed theological approach to the doctrine of Sola
Scriptura).

54.

See, e.g., Keith Bartholomew, Biblical and Constitutional Interpretation
and the Role of Originalism in Sixteenth and Twentieth-Century Societies,
82 Anglican Theological Rev. 537, 538 (2000) (citation omitted) (“By
originalism, I refer to the hermeneutical approach used by both biblical
and constitutional scholars (and followed by millions of lay persons) that
accords binding authority to the strict text of the source document or to
the intentions if its authors or adopters.”).
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term future of a new nation that would someday assume a dominant
position in the world. They were, for the most part, ordinary politicians
thinking in terms of their particularized concerns. To be sure, they were
confronting large issues with long-term significance. The government
that had been established to declare the independence of the thirteen
colonies and carry out the resulting war was failing as a means of
managing the nation that had emerged from these events.55 The task
confronting the delegates to the Convention, therefore, was to design a
political system rather than a specific statute. In doing so, however,
they were motivated by the same sorts of immediate concerns that are
almost universally recognized as the motivations for legislators in more
ordinary situations.56 They protected their personal political position in
their home states,57 based their votes on whether their home state was
large or small,58 protected slavery because they themselves, as well as
their important supporters, were slave holders,59 and reflected the
immediate and not necessarily well-founded fears of their constituents.60
There were obvious exceptions, including Benjamin Franklin,
George Washington, and Alexander Hamilton. But Franklin, elderly
and somewhat debilitated, generally limited himself to urging compro–
mise and unity,61 while Washington, already an icon, tended to remain
55.

Slonim, supra note 2, at 1–10.

56.

See generally John W. Kingdon, Congressmen’s Voting Decisions (3d
ed. 1989) (examining the decision-making process underlying legislative
voting decisions); David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral
Connection (1974) (describing how the quest for reelection motivates
almost all elected legislators’ conduct); Steven S. Smith & Gerald
Gamm, The Dynamics of Party Government in Congress, in Congress
Reconsidered 163 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., Sage
11th ed 2017) (emphasizing the need to distinguish between the policy and
electoral goals of congressional parties).

57.

See, e.g., Slonim, supra note 2, at 96 (describing how recently-elected
Governor of Virginia Edmund Randolph refused to sign the Constitution
because he was concerned about local opposition from Patrick Henry and
Richard Henry Lee).

58.

Id. at 41–50.

59.

Id. at 59–63, 64.

60.

See id. at 36–37, 40–41, 47–48.

61.

See Beeman, supra note 5, at 52 (“[W]eakened by age and painful kidney
stones—and less convinced of the need for dramatic change—he was
unlikely to supply either the energy or the ideas for a revolution in
government.”); see also Walter Isaacson, Benjamin Franklin: An
American Life 445–54 (2003). Franklin wanted to raise objections to
slavery at the Convention, but was persuaded by other Northern delegates
that it would endanger ratification of the Constitution. Joseph J. Ellis,
Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary Generation 110–11
(2000).
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neutral in his role as president of the Convention.62 The most important
exception was James Madison. As Professor Slonim recounts, Madison
seems to have been motivated by a genuine desire to create a strong
central government,63 a position he would soon repudiate.64 But he was
also an exception for being the one active participant who was truly an
extraordinary political thinker, worthy of being ranked with the great
theorists in the Western tradition. Ironically, his political theory was
grounded on the insight that government cannot teach virtue to its
citizens, and cannot rely on the virtue of its leaders, but will always be
a contest among self-interested individuals and factions.65 He himself,
on the basis of this theory, sought to create a strong central government
that could counteract the more particularized interests of the separate
states, but saw his vision eviscerated by the very process that he
declared unavoidable, and that formed the basis of his approach to
governance. As for Hamilton, he was at this time entirely allied with
Madison; thus, whatever his excellence of mind, his views suffered the
same degree of frustration.66
Because originalism is subject to well-known conceptual defects,
such as the difficulty of determining the intent of a collective body and
the difficulty of discerning the intentions of people in the distant past,67
some scholars who claim to be originalists have sought to distance their
approaches from the actual intentions of the delegates at the
Convention. One such approach is to shift attention to the intentions
of the ratifying conventions in the states, on the ground that it was
their actions that established the Constitution as authoritative law.68
Professor Slonim’s book challenges this view as well, and for the same
reason. The state ratifying conventions displayed the same mixture or
mélange of personal motivations and quotidian political interests as the
drafting Convention in Philadelphia.69 Several of the small states
62.

Beeman, supra note 5, at 110; Rakove, supra note 5, at 136; Joseph J.
Ellis, His Excellency: George Washington 177 (2004) (“Washington
was simultaneously the most important person at the Constitutional
Convention and the least involved in the debate that shaped the document
that emerged. His importance was a function of his presence . . . .”).

63.

Slonim, supra note 2, at 32 (“Madison was a supreme nationalist.”).

64.

Id. at 205–07.

65.

See The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison).

66.

See generally The Federalist No. 21 (Alexander Hamilton); Slonim,
supra note 2, at 17.

67.

See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,
60 B.U. L. Rev. 204, 214, 221–22 (1980).

68.

See, e.g., Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original
Intent, 5 Const. Comment. 77, 85–93 (1988).

69.

See, e.g., Slonim, supra note 2, at 127–51.
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hastened to ratify because they realized that they had gotten such a
sweet deal from the Convention.70 John Hancock, fortuitously recover–
ing from a case of gout that had kept him home while he weighed his
options, came out in favor of ratification and swayed the vote in
Massachusetts because the Federalists promised him the VicePresidency of the new nation, or the Presidency if George Washington
proved to be ineligible due to Virginia’s failure to ratify.71 The AntiFederalists, in the majority at the New York State convention, were
motivated to ratify because they simultaneously hoped that New York
City would be chosen as the nation’s capital if they did so and feared
that the City would secede from the State, for commercial reasons, if
they didn’t.72
A second and more formidable effort to distance originalism from
the actual intent of the Framers is the invocation of original public
meaning. This is a complex theory that, at its outer limits, views the
Constitution as an evolving process that would be only vaguely
informed by an historical account of its origins such as Professor
Slonim’s book.73 In its more delimited form, the claim is that the proper
interpretation of a constitutional provision should not be based on the
Framers’ personal or subjective views about the language they enacted,
but rather on the general understanding of that language at the time
of enactment.74 Whatever problems with the theory of originalism that

70.

See id. at 49–50, 134.

71.

Id. at 130–31.

72.

Id. at 149.

73.

See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 Const.
Comment. 291, 303–04 (2007); cf. Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and
Constitutional Redemption, 24 Const. Comment. 427, 447–51 (2007)
(arguing that originalism is a commitment to the principles of the
Constitution rather than how the framers meant for their words to apply
to future generations).

74.

See Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The
Presumption of Liberty 89–94 (2004); Keith E. Whittington, Cons–
titutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and
Judicial Review 35–37 (1999); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen,
The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 Geo.
L.J. 1113, 1132–33 (2003) (advocating that originalism pays attention to how
the words and phrases of the Constitution “would have been understood by a
hypothetical, objective, reasonably well-informed reader of those words and
phrases, in context, at the time they were adopted”); Gary Lawson, Proving
the Law, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 859, 875 (1992) (recognizing public opinion at
the time of Constitutional ratification is one method of interpretation); Samuel
T. Morison, The Crooked Timber of Liberal Democracy, 2005 Mich. St. L.
Rev. 461, 465 (2005). A related idea is that determining the original meaning
of the Constitution should rely on extra-legal sources. See Lawrence B. Solum,
Originalism and the Unwritten Constitution, 2013 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1935 (2013),
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this idea resolves, it does not rescue originalism from the implications
of Slonim’s observations.
The men who gathered in Philadelphia were members of the elite,
certainly among the best educated people in the nation. There were a
sufficient number of them to wash out truly idiosyncratic uses of
language, so that their actual intent, assuming it can be discerned,
would have been reasonably close to the public meaning of the
American elite as a whole. If the general public meaning of the language
was different, it would be because it included the views of much less
educated people, including subsistence farmers living in fairly isolated
settings.75 The normative argument for treating this larger group of
people with reverence, and granting their views more weight than their
mere enactment of positive law would demand, is rather weak. Professor
Slonim does not attempt to discern the views of this larger public, but
to the extent that they are reflected in his account of the leading
political actors, the dominant mood seems to have been fear—fear by
slaveholders that their slaves would be taken away, fear by residents of
small states that they would be conquered by their larger neighbors,
fear of internal rebellion by disadvantaged regions of the nation,76 and
fear by everyone that the new nation would fall prey to the great powers
that were hovering around them, specifically Britain, France, and
Spain.77 People who are afraid of things that we are not afraid of now
are not a particularly convincing source of wisdom.
If we proceed from theories of interpreting the U.S. Constitution to
theories of constitutionalism itself, Professor Slonim provides a similar
lesson. One of the best-known theories of the constitutional meaning is
Jon Elster’s idea of self-binding, which he derives from the story of
Ulysses and the Sirens.78 Knowing that the Sirens’ song will irresistibly
1973–75 (citing Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Unwritten Constitution:
The Precedents and Principles We Live By 247–48 (2012)).
75.

See Morris D. Forkosch, Who are the “People” in the Preamble to the
Constitution?, 19 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 644, 676–81 (1968). There is,
moreover, the sticky question of whether to include among the public
those who were excluded at the time, but whom we would insist on
including at present, such as African-Americans, Native Americans, and
women, collectively the majority of the nation’s inhabitants. See id. at
684–85, 708–09.

76.

See Slonim, supra note 2, at 33–39, 53 n.28, 131. Specifically, “Shays’
Rebellion” was an internal rebellion arranged by farmers as a response to
their desperate economic circumstance. Id. at 20–23.

77.

See id. at 4, 23–24, 47.

78.

Jon Elster, Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommit–
ment, and Constraints 88–92 (2000); Jon Elster, Ulysses and the
Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality 39–47 (1979) [herein–
after Ulysses and the Sirens].
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attract all those who hear it to abandon their voyage and die on the
Sirens’ island, Ulysses instructs his sailors to stop their ears with wax.
He, however, lashes himself to the mast of the ship and instructs the
sailors to keep him bound, no matter how insistently he entreats or,
being the captain, commands them to release him.79 Elster takes this as
a general pattern of rational action, where actors at Time One make a
definitive commitment that constrains their actions at Time Two, when
their rationality may be impaired.80 He then suggests that a Consti–
tution operates in this manner.81 The Framers, realizing that the
confusions and conflicts that will afflict a polity in a momentary crisis
may lead it to abandon its principles, embody those principles in a set
of rules intended to constrain such deviations.82
It is an inspiring image, and one that supports a mode of
interpretation that features fidelity to the original text of the
Constitution, and perhaps an originalist orientation. But it depends on
the assumption that the actors at Time One are more rational than at
Time Two, that they can think in more principled and less circum–
stantial terms.83 Professor Slonim’s account refutes this claim. He
demonstrates that the Framers were subject to the same confusions and
conflicts that affected future generations.84 They were just as bound by
their personal interests, their prejudices, and the immediate stresses of
79.

Homer, The Odyssey bk. XII, 441–43 (Maynard Mack ed., Alexander
Pope trans., London: Methuen & Co. Ltd. 1967) (“I give the sign, and
struggle to be free: Swift row my mates, and shoot along the sea; New
chains they add, and rapid urge the way, ‘Till dying off, the distant sounds
decay . . . .”).

80.

Ulysses and the Sirens, supra note 78, at 39–47.

81.

Id. at 88–174.

82.

Id.

83.

In fact, I have argued previously that Elster is wrong about both
constitutions and The Odyssey. See Edward L. Rubin, Hyperdepoliticization,
47 Wake Forest L. Rev. 631, 637 (2012). A constitution is not a case of
self-binding, as he asserts. A higher authority, the convention or
constitutional assembly, makes a law that binds subsequently selected
officials, just the way an ordinary statute binds those that are subject to it.
Unlike a legislature, the convention then passes out of existence, but this is
not the same thing as self-binding. Id. at 639–41. And in The Odyssey,
Ulysses does not decide to bind himself to the mast. A god, Circe, orders
him to do so, and Ulysses obeys because obedience to the gods is one of his
virtues, as established in the invocation. See Homer, supra note 79, at 28–
29, 430–33. In other words, Elster ignores the crucial issue of obedience to
law in using the image of Ulysses and the mast, possibly because he ignores
the issue of obedience in the original source. As argued here, we should not
treat the Constitution as the pronouncement of hyper-rational beings whom
we must revere, but as enacted law that we are required to obey that is
subject to interpretation on the basis of changed circumstances.

84.

See Slonim, supra note 2, at 127–51.
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their time as those who would be governed by the document that they
devised. Indeed, as just described, they either constituted or answered
to a public that was besieged by fear bordering on panic. Madison was
the exception (and Hamilton perhaps another), but Slonim
demonstrates that their vision for the national government was altered,
and indeed eviscerated, by the other delegates. What emerged then,
was not an optimal and timeless framework for the future, but a set of
makeshift provisions and patched-together compromises that would
provide a solution to the pressing problems of the time when the
document was drafted.
Again, while none of this means that the text of the Constitution
should be ignored, Professor Slonim’s book strongly suggests that the
reverential attitude toward the Framers that characterizes much of our
constitutional interpretation, particularly by judges and scholars who
regard themselves as originalists, is unjustified.85 Most of the Framers
were ordinary people subject to ordinary motivations, and, as such, are
entitled to no more deference or attention than their enactment itself
would demand. It can nonetheless be argued that the Constitution’s
text or intent is entitled to greater deference because it is an organic
enactment for the nation as a whole. The countervailing argument, of
course, is that the Constitution’s generality, and the fact that it was
written long ago by people who thought differently and faced different
issues, requires that it be interpreted flexibly if it is serve our purposes,
rather than frustrate them.86 This is a debate about interpretive theory
and cannot be resolved by an historical study such as Professor
Slonim’s. What his study suggests, however, is that the argument for
originalism must rest on this debate and cannot rely on arguments or
imagery about the superior wisdom, rationality, or impartiality of the
Constitution’s authors.
The implication that flows from this conclusion is that consti–
tutional provisions should be strictly enforced when they are supported
by some external norm to which we as a society are committed. In
particular, those provisions that protect human rights, such as the First
Amendment and the guarantees of equal protection and procedural due
process, are grounded in strong norms which are important to us, while
structural provisions such as federalism and the separation of powers
should be recognized as pragmatic arrangements that can be varied

85.

See id. (demonstrating that the Framers were ordinary people subject to
the same motivations as modern politicians).

86.

See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 415 (1819) (“This
provision is made in a constitution intended to endure for ages to come,
and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”);
see also Brandon J. Murrill, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R45129, Modes
of Constitutional Interpretation 7, 9–10 (2018).
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because they do not implicate such norms or commitments.87 This is, of
course, the position set out in footnote four of United States v. Carolene
Products,88 and that became the central theme of the Legal Process
School’s approach to constitutional interpretation.89 The footnote,
which emerged out of the Supreme Court’s rejection of substantive due
process,90 was based on the idea that the Court should not intrude into
87.

The argument that these structural features secure political and human rights
is too parochial to be accepted. The two independent organizations that rate
the level of democracy throughout the world give their highest rating to a
number of nations that have parliamentary systems with no separation of the
executive and the legislature, or unitary systems with no legal autonomy for
geographic subunits of the nation, or both. These organizations give the United
States, despite the structural features of the Constitution, a slightly lower
rating. See Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018, at 10, 106, 470,
480, 653, 700–01, 953, 1058, 1064 (Arch Puddington, ed., 2018) (on a 1 (best)
to 7 scale for two elements of freedom, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden and
United Kingdom receive a 1.0, while the United States receives a lower 1.5
rating, the same as Belize and Mongolia); The Economist Intelligence Unit’s
Democracy Index, Economist, https://infographics.economist.com/2019/
DemocracyIndex/ [https://perma.cc/SQ6W-QLP5] (last visited Oct. 10, 2020)
(on a 1 (worst) to 10 scale, the ratings are: Germany, 8.68, Japan, 7.99,
Netherlands, 8.89, Sweden, 9.39, while the United States is rated 7.96, about
the same as Botswana and Estonia); see also Italy: Main Executive and
Legislative Bodies, Eurydice (Mar. 6, 2020, 3:56 PM), https://eacea.ec.
europa.eu/national-policies/eurydice/content/main-executive-and-legislativebodies-39_en [https://perma.cc/NXZ5-2EEN]; Government and Society:
Constitutional Framework, Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/place/
Japan/Government-and-society [https://perma.cc/GT5D-ZDZ7] (last visited
Oct. 14, 2020); Chuka Nwanazia, The Trias Politica: Dutch System of
Government and Why it Matters, DutchReview (May 23, 2018),
https://dutchreview.com/culture/society/the-trias-politica-dutch-system-ofgovernment/ [https:// perma.cc/J4CQ-77EN]; National Parliaments: Sweden,
Libr. Cong. (July 24, 2020), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/nationalparliaments/sweden.php [https://perma.cc/3UC4-9WW8]; The Three Branches of Government, LawWales, https://law.gov.wales/constitution-govern
ment/intro-to-constitution/three-branches-government/?lang=en#/ constitu
tion-government/intro-to-constitution/three-branches-government/?tab=over
view&lang=en [https://perma.cc/57VV-3TV9] (last visited Oct. 14, 2020).

88.

304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).

89.

See Choper, supra note 6, at 75; Ely, supra note 6, at 75–76, 151–53; A.
Michael Froomkin, Climbing the Most Dangerous Branch: Legisprudence
and the New Legal Process (Book Review), 66 Tex. L. Rev. 1071, 1081
& n.65 (1988).

90.

The definitive case, West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, had been decided the
previous term. 300 U.S. 379, 389–91, 400 (1937) (holding that substantive
due process rights do not exist that can prevent states from restricting the
terms of private contracts when they are acting to protect the welfare of
citizens). West Coast Hotel overruled Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261
U.S. 525 (1923), and distinguished Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo,
298 U.S. 587 (1936).
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democratic decisions except to correct defects in the political process
itself, such as denial of the right to vote.91 Legal Process scholars,
unwilling to restrict human rights protection to such a narrow compass,
developed the idea that all human rights should be protected by the
Court because they defend against the tyranny of the majority (a
central concern of Madison’s) whereas structural provisions would be
enforced by majoritarian politics,92 such as the role of the states in the
national legislature that the Framers established over Madison’s
objection. Professor Slonim’s book suggests a third rationale for this
same principle, namely, that the Framers were ordinary politicians
whose pronouncements possess no greater normative force than ordin–
ary legislation, and that constitutional provisions should be interpreted
with the usual flexibility and concern for practicality and efficiency
unless they can derive their normative value from some other source.93

III. The Electoral College
Of the Constitution’s structural features, the one that is perhaps
most strange and convoluted is the Electoral College. George Edwards
III and Sanford Levinson have stated the basic argument against it,
which is that it is inconsistent with our current conception of democ–
racy.94 Arguments in favor are notoriously weak, often little more than

91.

The footnote is composed of two elements. Carolene, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
The first is that “[i]t is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation
which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected
to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more
exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment than are most other types of legislation.” Id. The second is
that “[n]or need we enquire whether . . . prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied
upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry.” Id. at 153 n.4. As is apparent from the
language, both elements point to defects in the political process as the
basis of heightened scrutiny. Id. at 152 n.4.

92.

See Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme
Court at the Bar of Politics 18–19 (2d ed. 1962); Choper, supra note
6, at 4–6, 9–10; The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison); Jeffrey Rosen,
America is Living James Madison’s Nightmare, Atlantic (October 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/10/james-madisonmob-rule/568351/ [https://perma.cc/HBJ4-FLA8]; William N. Eskridge Jr.
& Philip P. Frickey, The Making of the Legal Process, 107 Harv. L. Rev.
2031, 2031, 2042 (1994); Kent Roach, What’s New and Old About the Legal
Process, 47 U. Toronto L.J. 363, 374, 393 (1997).

93.

See supra notes 7–19 and accompanying text.

94.

George C. Edwards III, Why the Electoral College is Bad for
America 150–51, 157–58 (2004); Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic
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generalized objections to change.95 As Professor Slonim’s account explains, the device was an improvised alternative to majority voting or
legislative selection, designed to appease the fears of the small states
and incorporating the inequalities that had already been established to
appease the fears of the slave states.96 It seemed like an acceptable
solution at a time when democracy was still an untried experiment,
when the British system of representation that the Framers knew
imposed highly restrictive property qualifications on the grounds that
only a small elite could be expected to vote responsibly,97 and when the
other leading examples of electoral regimes were the Ancient Greek citystates reflected through the accounts of Aristotle, Plutarch, and Cicero,
where Rome and Sparta were more admired than Athens.98 Things have
changed since then. The Western world has more than two centuries of
experience with democracy, much of it successful, and our current view
Constitution: Where the Constitution Goes Wrong (And How We
the People Can Correct It) 81–83, 85–91, 95–97 (2006).
95.

See, e.g., Tara Ross, Why We Need the Electoral College 32
(2017) (“The Founders’ Constitution employs an elaborate system of
checks, balances, and separated powers . . . [e]liminating any one of them
is certain to have unintended and potentially devastating consequences.”);
John O. McGinnis, Popular Sovereignty and the Electoral College, 29 Fla.
St. U. L. Rev. 995, 995 (2001) (“[A]n electoral system designed to distill
the will of a national majority would have a tendency to lead to notions
of social democracy that are foreign to the American experience . . . .”);
John Yoo, A Defense of the Electoral College in the Age of Trump, 46
Pepp. L. Rev. 833, 860 (2019) (“If we should discard with the Electoral
College as an obstacle to the majority, critics should explain why the
American people should retain the Constitution’s other limits on pure
majoritarian democracy. . . . Why not replace [American separation of
powers] with a British-style parliament . . . ?”).

96.

Slonim, supra note 2, at 39–41.

97.

Donald Ratcliffe, The Right to Vote and the Rise of Democracy, 1787–1828,
33 J. Early Republic 219, 220–21 (2013); Pat Stuart, Voting: The Great
American Experiment, Powell Trib. (May 19, 2020, 8:05 AM),
https://www.powelltribune.com/stories/voting-the-great-americanexperiment, 25446 [https://perma.cc/24FY-4YH6]. This view, widely accep–
ted in the eighteenth century, became one of the dominant political issues of
the nineteenth century, but even after two reform bills, only a small majority
of the most prosperous people in England had the right to vote for members
of Parliament. See 4 Winston S. Churchill, A History of the EnglishSpeaking Peoples: The Great Democracies 45–54 (1958); 3 G.M.
Trevelyan, History of England 158–60, 163, 170–80, 182–84, 186–89,
191, 203–04 (3d ed. 1945); see also Malcolm Chase, Chartism: A New
History 2 (2007) (discussing the first Reform Bill).

98.

See Paul Cartledge, Democracy 293–97, 299, 301–04 (2016); Gordon
S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution 100–03
(1991); Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic
1776–1787, at 423–25 (1969); The Federalist No. 63 (James Madison).
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is that the citizens themselves should decide. But the Electoral College
system persists. Instead of being lashed to the mast of rationality, we
are confined below decks in the ship of state’s scullery, amidst the
outworn and grimy utensils left over from earlier times.
A possible escape route from this artifact of the Convention’s
eighteenth-century conflicts is at hand. The National Popular Vote
Interstate Compact (NPV) is an agreement among a group of states to
award their electoral votes to the candidate who receives the largest
popular vote, regardless of who achieves a majority of the popular votes
in that state.99 The agreement will only go into effect if states with more
than 270 electoral votes join; at that point, it will determine the
election.100 Currently, 16 jurisdictions with 196 electoral votes have
joined, almost all tending to vote Democratic in presidential elections.101
Prospects for obtaining agreement of states with the remaining 74 votes
are uncertain, but far from impossible.102 If these are obtained, however,
99.

Michael Brody, Circumventing the Electoral College: Why the National
Popular Vote Interstate Compact Survives Constitutional Scrutiny Under
the Compact Clause, 5 Legis. & Pol’y Brief 33, 33–34 (2013).

100. See Cong. Rsch. Serv., R43823, The National Popular Vote (NPV)
Initiative: Direct Election of the President by Interstate
Compact 7 (2019); John R. Koza, Barry F. Fadem, Mark Grueskin,
Michael S. Mandell, Robert Richie & Joseph F. Zimmerman, Every
Vote Equal: A State-Based Plan for Electing the President by
National Popular Vote 265 (4th ed. 2013).
101. A National Popular Vote for President, FairVote, https://www.fairvote.
org/national_popular_vote [https://perma.cc/VSQ3-C8K2] (last visited Oct.
2, 2020). As of January 2020, the NPV has been adopted by California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico, New Jersey, New York, Oregon,
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. Cong. Rsch. Serv., NPV—The
National Popular Vote Initiative: Proposing Direct Election of
the President Through an Interstate Compact, https://
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11191 [https://perma.cc/ C8S4SJY4] (Oct. 29, 2019); Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures, National
Popular Vote (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-andcampaigns/national-popular-vote.aspx [https://perma.cc/35AV-V36A]. All
these states have voted Democratic in the seven presidential elections since
1992, except Colorado in 1996, 2000 and 2004 and New Mexico in 2004.
Presidential Voting History by State, Ballotpedia, https://ballotpedia.org/
Presidential_voting_history_by_state [https://perma.cc/V2P6-88W4] (last
visited Oct. 3, 2020).
102. The NPV has been introduced but not enacted in a number of states. See
Julia Foodman, National Popular Vote: A Status Update, FairVote (July
1, 2019), https://www.fairvote.org/national_popular_vote_a_ status_
update?gclid=EAIaIQobChMI8KWc0cLz5gIVGaSzCh1TVAgTEAAYAS
AAEgJ8lvD_BwE [https://perma.cc/Q33R-PN4H]. Nate Silver has offered
a statistical analysis demonstrating that the NPV would not favor either
political party. See Nate Silver, Will the Electoral College Doom the
Democrats Again?, FiveThirtyEight (Nov. 14, 2016, 2:59 PM),
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there will then be a legal challenge to NPV on the ground that it
constitutes an “interstate compact” for which the Constitution requires
Congressional approval.103
There is substantial uncertainty about whether the NPV falls
within the prohibition of this clause. While it would appear to be a
compact among the states, the Supreme Court has held that only
agreements “tending to the increase of political power in the States,
which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the
United States” require Congressional approval.104 Scholars have
expressed a variety of conflicting views about whether the NPV would
constitute such an encroachment.105 They have also disagreed on
whether the NPV would infringe on the rights of states that were not
party to the agreement.106 But the odds are that the current Court
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/will-the-electoral-college-doom-thedemocrats-again/ [https://perma.cc/245L-A3EY]. However, the pattern of
enactments thus far suggests that approvals will come only from states that
have Democratic voting records in presidential elections. The number of
states that are as consistently Democratic as those that have already agreed
is small, but if momentum builds and some of the states that have tended
to be more Democratic than Republican in recent elections (Maine,
Minnesota, Michigan, New Hampshire, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Virginia,
Wisconsin) join, the NPV could go into effect. See Presidential Voting
History by State, supra note 101; see also 2017 Party Affiliation by State,
Gallup, https://news.gallup.com/poll/226643/2017-party-affiliation-state.
aspx [https://perma.cc/3XKX-FU49] (last visited Oct. 12, 2020).
103. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No state shall, without the Consent of
Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another
State . . . .”).
104. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893). See U.S. Steel Corp. v.
Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 469–70 (1978) (reaffirming that,
per Virginia, “not all agreements between States are subject to the
strictures of the Compact Clause”).
105. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Some Thoughts on the Electoral College: Past,
Present, and Future, 33 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 467, 477–78 (2007) (explaining
that agreements between states, such as the NPV, are not truly interstate
compacts); Ian J. Drake, Federal Roadblocks: The Constitution and the
National Public Vote Interstate Compact, 44 Publius 681, 681–83 (2007)
(arguing that the NPV would displace a federal mechanism for determining
presidential elections); Adam Schleifer, Interstate Agreement for Electoral
Reform, 40 Akron L. Rev. 717, 739–40 (2007) (asserting that the NPV
would limit the power of the national government by displacing the
authority of the House of Representatives to resolve contested elections).
106. Compare Drake, supra note 105, at 682, 687 (arguing that NPV member
states will decrease the power of nonmember states by actually
determining the election), and Derek T. Muller, The Compact Clause and
the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, 6 Elec. L.J. 372, 373
(2007) (contending that the NPV increases the power of populous states
vis-a-vis less populous ones), with Jennifer S. Hendricks, Popular Election
of the President: Using or Abusing the Electoral College?, 7 Elec. L.J.
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would strike down the NPV on one ground or another. Although it is
generally advisable to avoid vulgar political realism when discussing the
Court, the fact remains that the conservative majority of the last two
decades has repeatedly decided cases with direct and significant
political consequences in favor of the Republican party, often on
grounds that seem questionable, at best.107
Professor Slonim’s book suggests that this would be the wrong
decision. No independent norms support the complex and idiosyncratic
Electoral College system.108 In fact, our prevailing norm of democracy—
that the majority should decide—runs strongly in the opposite
direction. The argument for interpreting the Electoral College
provisions, and the interstate compact provision that might protect it,
in a strict rather than flexible manner must therefore rest on a belief
that these provisions represent some particularly wise and prescient
vision on the part of the Framers. In fact, they represent nothing of the
sort. The Framers in general were ordinary politicians, responding to
the crises of their times and the misconceptions of the moment on the
basis of self-interest, prejudice, and compromise. In crafting the
Electoral College, they were motivated by a sense of small state identity
that quickly disappeared and a commitment to slavery that we now
regard an anathema. It is time to put these provisions in their place.
They are law, but they are old law that should be flexibly interpreted
in light of current norms and circumstances.

218, 224 (2008) (arguing that non-member states do not lose any preexisting power if the NPV goes into effect).
107. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2497–98, 2500–01 (2019)
(declaring that partisan gerrymandering is an abuse of democratic processes
but that the Court would do nothing about it because any remedy would
require more complicated mathematics than the one-person-one-vote
standard that the Court imposes); Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529,
551, 557 (2013) (striking down highly effective preclearance provisions of
the Voting Rights Act because they were based on data collected at the
time of enactment); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310,
371–72 (2010) (striking down portions of federal election law limits on
campaign contributions on the ground that corporations have First
Amendment rights); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 101, 105–06, 110 (2000)
(allowing determination of Florida’s Republican Secretary of State to stand
on the basis of an unprecedented equal protection rationale, thereby
ensuring Bush’s election as President).
108. See Stanley Chang, Updating the Electoral College: The National Popular
Vote Legislation, 44 Harv. J. on Legis. 205, 205 (2007) (“The Electoral
College is an anomaly of the American democracy.”).
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